DUTCH CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARMS TRADE PRESS
RELEASE
14 January 2005
Pakistan has acquired more advanced Dutch ultracentrifuge technology in
the 1970's than was publicly known so far (1). Centrifuges that have
been found in Iran and Libya are also based on this technology, and not
on older models as was widely assumed till now. That conclusion is
drawn in the most recent issue of the specialist information service
Nuclear Fuel.
Information compiled by Nuclear Fuel suggests that besides the
previously assumed theft from the Netherlands by the nuclear spy Abdul
Qadeer Khan of the technology of three other models (CNOR, SNOR and
G-2), know-how from the later 4-M ultracentrifuge programme of UCN
(formerly the Dutch branch of the British-German-Dutch company Urenco,
now Enrichment Technology Nederland, or ET NL) made its way to
Pakistan.
According to experts in Nuclear Fuel parts of the so-called P-1
centrifuge resemble the design of the 4-M centrifuge. P-1 is a
Pakistan-built ultracentrifuge that has been sold by black marketeers
to at least Iran and Libya.
A secret Dutch report, that underlies the public report on the Khan
affair that was sent to Dutch parliament in March 1980, noted already
in July 1979 that Khan had had access to 4-M technology, then under
development. Dutch VPRO radio programme Argos, that has a copy of the
secret report, mentions so this morning. The public report nowhere says
a word about 4-M and is in general very reserved in mentioning what
Khan could have taken away from the Netherlands to Pakistan in the
1970's.
Nevertheless Ben Bot, Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote last
year to parliament, after new details emerged on Khan's nuclear network
and the centrifuges based on Urenco technology found in Iran and Libya:
"For as far as it concerns the so-called "Khan affair" and Urenco, also
now after 24 years, there is nothing to add to this report." Bot notes:
"The finding in Iran and Libya of centrifuges of the old Urenco design
though strengthens the in the report mentioned serious suspicion that
A.Q. Khan has stolen the blueprints of this."
With the new information from Nuclear Fuel, Bot does have quite
something to explain, according to the Dutch Campaign against Arms
Trade. It has to be made clear which knowledge the government has on
Pakistan's access to the much newer 4-M technology. Has Khan himself
had access to this while in the Netherlands, or has the technology been
leaked through other people? Also must be explained why this important
information was never added to the public report on Khan.
The connection between the 4-M and P-1 centrifuge is also remarkable,
as most publications so far assumed that P-1 was a variant of older
European models, mostly G-1 or G-2. Even UN nuclear agency IAEA wrote
in February last year in a report on the Libyan nuclear programme that:
"The L-1 centrifuge design is an old design of European origin, also
referred to as G-1, or P-1." That footnote now appears to be incorrect.
The G-1 centrifuge is an older, simpler, originally German type of
ultracentrifuge. Nuclear Fuel though quotes a senior official involved
in both the Libyan and Iranian investigation, who says: "There is no
connection with G-1 in the centrifuge programme in either Iran or
Libya" and: "If there is a statement in a report that equates P-1 and
G-1, it is a mistake." According to the official the 'finger prints'
are Dutch, not German. Research by Nuclear Fuel also reveals that some
details of the P-1 significantly resemble the 4-M centrifuge, for
example regarding the number of four rotor-tube segments.
These new details throw important new light on the three decades long
dragging nuclear espionage affair, in which the Netherlands plays a
dubious role. Because of laxity and possibly even on purpose, Khan and
consorts have had free way for many years. 26 December last year the
New York Times made headline news here with their claim that the CIA
had twice withheld Dutch authorities from arresting Khan, one time in
the late seventies and once in the eighties, to keep a better eye on
Pakistan's nuclear programme.
It was already longer known that the Netherlands, despite strong signs
in that direction, had failed to interfere when Khan was still working
in the Netherlands, that is up to December 1975. Afterwards he has also
visited the Netherlands on several occasions. At least once that
happened with approval from then BVD (Dutch Internal Security Service)
chief Docters van Leeuwen, revealed radio programme Argos October last
year.
Khan has been tried for theft of nuclear technology while at work with
UCN or FDO-Stork (then the main subcontractor to the Dutch
ultracentrifuge programme). He was tried though in absentia in the
mid-eighties for two letters that he had written to a former colleague,
in which Khan asks for detailed information of some ultracentrifuge
components. After being sentenced of four years imprisonment, Khan was
acquitted by an appeals court due to a technicality.
"Finally now, the Dutch government must give complete clearness about
this huge nuclear proliferation scandal, that time and again reveals
new information on the doubtful role that the Netherlands plays in it",
says Frank Slijper of the Dutch Campaign against Arms Trade. Dutch
policy in the Khan affair has since the mid-seventies always been aimed
at damage control. Thirty years after Khan left the country there is
still little known about the nature and magnitude of the spreading of
nuclear arms technology. It is clear though that a significant part of
it is of Dutch origin. Also, allegedly, nuclear business has run
through the Netherlands till very recently (2). It is therefore high
time for complete openness on the Khan network.
Notes for the press: